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Conceptual Outline

I.

World War II: The "Good War"
A. How does society construct and image of a good war?
B. How does this construct reflect upon the returning veteran?
C. How does the stigmatized veteran respond to society?

II.

The War in General
A. World War II and civilians
B. World War II and returning veterans
C. The wounded Veteran

III.

Interviews (Method the same as for Vietnam, noted in Section X)
A. George Boggs III
B. Bert R. Manhoff
C. Frank Dauster

IV.

Once home
A. How were veterans treated?
B. How did veterans view themselves?
C. How did veterans view their combat experience?

V.

Conclusion: The construct of a good war in the eyes of the veteran versus the
eyes of the civilian society to which he returned.

VI.

Vietnam: The "Bad War"
A. How does society construct an image ofa bad war?
B. Generally, how does this construct reflect upon the returning veteran?
C. How does the stigmatized veteran respond to society?

VII.

The War in general
A. Confusion of public
1. Slow, steady entrance into combat position
2. Optimism of government vs. lengthiness of war
3. Instead of economy boom, recession
B. Confusion of veterans
1. Patriotism, yet undefined objectives
2. Limitations by politicians on military strategy
3. Shallow reporting=rewritten government releases that
contradicted the time and reality of Vietnam
C. Patriotisnl and duty

VIII.

The Split Generation
A. Fathers' World War IT Generation
1. Came of age in DRASTICALLY different era

-

-

-

-

a. Depression
b. War as a solution, positive thing
c. All young men served
2. Cold War against Communism
3. Militaristic "We can win anything" optimism
4. Upwardly mobile adulthood=ease of Vietnam generations' youth
B. Early (up to 1968) volunteers and patriots
a. Perceived Communism as ilnminent threat during youth
b. Grew up listening to glorified war stories
c. Optimistic view of war and America's world leadership
C. Late (after 1968) volunteers and draftees
a. Knew older brothers, uncles who had served in Vietnam
b. Saw visual images of the war on television
c. Heard civilians questioning the involvement and strategy
d. Low draft # or deferment=decreased pressure to serve/gave
options to otherwise willing volunteers

-

-

IX.

Combat and Military Service in Vietnam
A. Strain of guerilla warfare
1. \Vbo is the enemy
2. Training
3. Nighttime attacks and ambushes
B. Strain from divided United States
1. Anti-war movement
2. Socio-economic and racist implications of soldiers in combat
3. Final years and the imperative to end the war
C. Strain from general lack of objectives and attainable goals
1. Win the hearts and minds of the people objective
2. Defensive position only
3. Constant rotation of troops=new and old soldiers together
4. Loss of surprise and force due to political mechanics

X.

Interviews
A. What was the motivation for military service?
1. Patriotism
2. Nothing else to do
3. Anti ..communist
4. Drafted
B. How did they perceive the enemy?
1. Close contact
2. Dehumanized (or humanized)
3. Civilians as the enemy
C. How easily did they adapt to combat?
1. Justification for actions in combat?
2. Personal moral code vs. Learned acts of war
D. Upon returning home, did they maintain military ties?
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1. Veterans organizations

2. Friends in the military
3. Continued service
E. Upon returning home, how did they interact with civilians?
1. Jobs
2. Benefits
3. Mood of the nations towards the military

XI.

Once home
A. How were veterans treated?
B. How did veterans view themselves?
C. How did veterans view their combat experience?

XII.

Conclusion: The construct of a bad war in the eyes of civilians vs. the eyes of
veterans

XIII.

Overall comparison of World War II and Vietnam:
While veterans of World War II and veterans of Vietnam were
treated drastically different by the societies to which they returned, their
shared feelings of isolation and unrest evolved from returning to societies
whose constructs of the wars in which they fought were created to reflect the
civilians' shared involvement in the war, and not the involvement of the
veterans. The combat experiences of veterans in the "Good War" and in the
"Bad War" are the same, and in their eyes, there is but one type of war that
exists. War is neither good nor bad, but amoral. The men who experienced
\var know this. Society does not.
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The Good War vs. The Bad War: An Analysis of Combat Veterans' Experience in
World War II and Vietnam by Removing Social Stigma
By Shelley R. Stafford

Creation of a Good War
The image of a good war, free from immorality and unnecessary destruction,
exists in the memories of those who never experienced battle. We are taught to believe
that violent action among humans is acceptable when it is for a good cause. Thus, the
results of the atrocities that accompany the good cause are viewed as necessary sacrifice.
In our collective memory, we see an ideal situation in which happy, well-adjusted young
men go to defend an ideologically pure country. The events that occur during combat are
simply accepted as part of war, but they are not discussed for fear of robbing the glory of
victory. Happy, well-adjusted soldiers return home, ready to jump back into the life that
they had left. What the soldiers experienced in combat is of only passing interest to the
rest of society, and is easily forgotten. However, the men whose lives were physically
and mentally altered in war make it hard for society to forget the undesirable aspects of
war. The men who returned home bearing physical or mental wounds are the unwanted
reminders of the other side of a good war. Veterans whose physical appearance was
altered by war proved to be a visible roadblock in society'S effort to expunge itself of any
guilt about war, and they slowly coerced a propagandized society to view war differently
than from the eyes of a national press. Exuberant boys who returned home as reserved
men caused society to realize that the events of war are life changing and permanent even
if no physical battle scars exist. Naturally, these injections of reality into sn1all
communities that already had an idealistic image of the war and why it was fought and
how it affected those involved disturbed notions of the "good" war. Instead of accepting
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the veterans' perspective of war, society forced these bearers of reality to confonn to the
popular image of an idealized war.
The image of the good war was a concept that evolved in the minds of people
after the conclusion of the war. In reality, the good war concept had an abundance of
fallacies that society did not know how to handle. Men and boys went to war for reasons
that were hardly disputed. Ironically, most men had no personal incentive for fighting in
the war. The event itself attracted quickly made soldiers, and it held promises of
adventure, not of moral elevation. Combat showed young men horrible things that made
them question why they had been so enthusiastic about the war. The promise of
excitement soon gave way to a longing to return home. The construct of home in the
soldiers' minds became an elaborate image ofhannony and balance in the midst of a
world of dishannony and imbalance. When it finally came time to return home, the
soldier's mental image was once again violated when they found themselves amidst a
society of uninfonned and naIve people. They no longer felt at ease in the comfort of
their parent's homes, nor did their own wives and children understand what they had
endured. This planted the seed of isolation in the veterans, where it continued to grow as
they lived and encountered more aspects of civilian life. 1
For the men whose physical appearance and ability was altered during combat,
the return to civilian life was particularly difficult. The American public had a hard time
accepting the disabled into all social spheres. They were expected to readjust quickly and
forget as much as possible about their physical handicap. They were admired for their
"wonderful attitude." This would enable them to be role models for other disabled
soldiers. Also, the disabled veterans received significant unwanted public attention,
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which made them feel freaky and defective. In fact, wounded men who returned to the
United States were treated as though they were diseased. Coming to terms with the
challenge of undesired public attention represented a major obstacle for many World War
II disabled soldiers. Along with the obvious change in a wounded veteran's life, he was
also burdened by the mental obligation of reconciling his personal sacrifice with the cost
of supporting a cause. The wounded veteran was forced to come to terms with the moral
void of war that called for such costly personal sacrifice. The wounded soldier was
forced to confront a dilemnla: whether his rationale for fighting in the war justified his
sacrifice. 2
Because soldiers fought in a good war, it is commonly believed that most veterans
of World War II adjusted quickly and easily to civilian life. Since World War II was a
good war, veterans committed no acts during war that would later come back to haunt
them in the form of a post-traumatic stress disorder. However, combat in World War II
was a terrible experience that left physical and mental scars on most soldiers. This does
not fit the image of the good war of society's construct, because many thought that

..

somehow, bad combat occurred only in a bad war?

-

the young men who were to go to war. It was an event that offered an alternative to a

-

-

-

World War II, like other wars, was conceived as something to look forward to by

previously dreary segment of American history: the Depression. Young men who had
grown up during the Depression were the same men who fought in World War II. It was
a chance to break free from the constraints that had held them to a locality or a vocation.
Instead of foreseeing the future as a completed portrait, World War II made it possible for
young men and women to generate excitement for a new and exciting future. The great

3

-

-

-

-

-

moral imperatives of fighting in World War II had yet to completely surface, but the
patriotic imperative to fight for one's country in its time of need was obvious and
overwhelming. Men simply felt that it was their duty to fight, and it was a potentially
gratifying duty. However, the attitude of patriotism and willingness to fight by American
servicemen in all theaters of World War II was challenged, as it had been in all wars by
the shock of combat, especially if the soldier was wounded. This abrupt injection of
reality into the bravado of going to war for the good of the nation and the civilized world
was initially unbearable unless he could formulate his own moral justification for having
taken part in it. The ability of a young, wounded soldier to rationalize his participation in
combat was especially important. Once wounded, the soldier needed reasons for having
participated in combat in order to internalize his personal sacrifice for the war.
Yeterans today are beginning to discuss their memories of World War II.
Through this testimony, veterans who were wounded, either physically or mentally, can
verbalize the reality of not only war, but also of their difficult return to civilian life. The
following excerpts from interviews with World War II veterans serve as a microcosm of
veteran sentiments.
George Boggs ill began his Army career in the ROTC program at Rutgers. After
the bombing of Pearl Harbor, he realized that war was inevitable. He did not feel
particularly prepared for war, but he was very charged to "get over there and do
something about it." Boggs was sent to the Pacific theater after he completed training. 4
Boggs stated that he had "no druthers" about whom he was to fight. He was not
fearful of the Germans, yet he did not shirk from fighting against the Japanese. He
accepted his assignment from the Army to go to the Pacific with little emotion. He knew
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that both the Germans and the Japanese had committed atrocities during the war, but he
was not inclined to fight the Germans because of the Holocaust, nor was he inclined to
fight the Japanese because of Pearl Harbor. His involvement in the war was strictly a
response to the call of his country.5
Boggs was in very close contact with the Japanese during his service in the
Pacific. He attributes his fear of the Japanese during combat to the fact that it was they
whom he fought, not the Germans. A significant event that persists in Boggs' memory of
combat is of a face-to-face confrontation with a Japanese soldier. During an exchange of
fire with a Japanese platoon, Boggs jumped into a land crater for cover. Ironically, he
chose a crater that was already occupied by a Japanese soldier. He faced the enemy
soldier and shot the man at point blank range. Boggs' comment about this event
symbolizes the realization that most American soldiers discovered. He stated that he
"could shoot him (the Japanese soldier) because he was the enemy, but when he lay there
dying, he was human.,,6
American soldiers went to war with enthusiasm for their mission and patriotism
for their country. However, the youthful lure of excitement and honor through duty were
challenged by the grim truth of combat. Justinian wrote of the same phenomenon during
the Roman wars. Combat experience challenged the initial exuberance that a young man
felt about his mission in the war. No longer could Boggs view the enemy as inhuman
after he watched the Japanese soldier die by his actions. Boggs was left to reconcile the
necessity of killing the enemy soldier with the bloodstains that remained on his fatigues
and conscience for days. Had he not acted, Boggs would surely have been killed. That
which Boggs experienced when he realized the humanity of the enemy reflects a wider
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realization throughout soldiers in combat. A contradiction exists between that which they
are taught to do by the government, and that which their nlorality dictates. This
contradiction is often magnified by the onset of old age.
During combat in the St. David Islands, Boggs was shot in his left side and back.
Paralysis in his legs for the greater part of a year resulted from these injuries, as well as
internal damage. His recovery process was very long and complex. Boggs stated that he
had considered making a career of the military before his wounds, but was no longer of
any use to the Army. The pension that Boggs received from the Army "has been handy
through the years," but his readjustment to civilian life as a wounded veteran was poorly
compensated. 7
Boggs did not join a veterans' organization such as the American Legion upon his
return. The isolation that he felt upon returning to civilian life penetrated even the bond
that he shared with other American servicemen. He stated that he had nothing in
common with the men in the veterans' organizations. Boggs returned to the United
States with both physical and mental wounds. While he recovered from his physical
wounds, the mental wounds that he sustained in combat have haunted an otherwise happy
and successful lifetime. 8
Bert R. Manhoff also served in the Anny during World War II. He is from New
Jersey, and grew up in a strong Jewish community. His youth was burdened by the
responsibility of being the family provider after the death of his father during the
Depression. After he graduated from high school, Manhoff agreed to attend Montclair
State due to the lure of a guaranteed job in exchange for playing football. However, the
bombing of Pearl Harbor charged him with a desire to serve his nation, and he began
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work in the Anny in the War Department. He soon joined the tank destroyers, impelled
by what he had seen in literature about the branches of the military. 9
Manhoff provides insight to the mentality of soldiers during training for combat.
He relates a story about his time in training that illuminates that which soldiers about to
enter combat held as routine. During his training at Fort Hood, in Texas, Manhoffrecalls
watching two men insult several soldiers. In response, the soldiers retaliated by throwing
one man over a post in front of the restaurant where they were eating. Manhoff stated
that this incident shows how the soldiers, himself included, were taught to become war
machines. He summarized that his training in the Army taught him "life meant nothing
under certain situations."lo
Manhoff s military service afforded him lots of action in combat. He was part of
the build-up and the invasion of Normandy on Omaha Beach. His remarks about the
invasion are that "there are no atheists in foxholes." "Everyone was appealing for help,
whether from God or the tree in front of him." He was part of a unit that also later
liberated Nancy, France. Upon arriving into town, he spotted and visited the remnants of

..

a Jewish synagogue. During the Nazi occupation of the town, the synagogue served as a

-

Manhoff s response to this scene was the development of an "ingrained hatred" of the

..
-

storage area for animals. Animal feces and other damage defiled the synagogue.

Nazis. Not only did he feel hatred for the Nazis because he was Jewish, but he also stated
that the things that he saw in Nancy, as well as in the concentration camps that he helped.
liberate made him believe that people of "all religions" should feel the same hatred that
he felt towards the Nazi's.

remarked that he had no problem with killing Gennans in

7
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combat, neither then or now. He expressed concern that the theory errlbodied by Nazi
Germany could once again surface in society. 11
Manhoff was diagnosed at the end of his 1OO-day tour in Europe as "Psychoneurotic-moderate-severe." He refers to this disability as "war nerves." Because of this
condition, Manhoff has blocked much of his memory of the invasion and of the liberation
of Buchenwald. However, certain images are burned into his memory and persist to
haunt hinl in nightmares and in daytime memory lapses. Like Boggs, Manhoff camlot
hear the roar of an airplane without fear.12

..

-

-

Part of Manhoff s disability that hindered his readjustment to civilian life was a
strong feeling of isolation. When he returned to Rutgers after the war on the GI Bill, he
was paired with an eighteen-year old roommate who had never been part of the military.
One night when both he and his roommate were in bed, Manhoff heard an airplane and
dove to the floor in an attempt to dig a foxhole for cover. He recalled the reaction of his
roommate, and stated that he then realized that a gap existed between those who had
experienced combat and those who had not. He regards the members of veterans'
organizations as "phonies" whose experiences in the military did not compare with his
own. 13
Manhoff s care by the government after returning home consisted of a pension
that was systematically reduced over intervals of time. By the good fortune of being
friends with the son of a Veteran's Administration doctor, Manhoff was written a letter
stating that he suffered from a permanent condition. This enabled him to maintain the
already reduced pension that he had been receiving. The final diagnosis from a military
doctor that Manhoffreceived instructed him to "keep totally occupied." Manhoffwas
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literally told to not think about what had happened during the war, much less talk about
his experiences. He was urged to move on with his life as quickly as possible. The GI
Bill urged him to return to the youth that he left when he went to war. Whether or not he
had come to terms with his experiences in the war, Manhoff, like so many other veterans,
was expected to adapt to a civilian world that did not want to hear about the bad
experiences of previously good boys in a good war.14
Manhoff s current views on warfare are identical to the mindset that he
had while he was in the Army. The creation of men as "war machines" during training
for combat is ingrained in Manhoff s character. He feels that the use of the atomic bomb
on Japanese civilians was justified because "nobody is innocent." However, Manhoff
expressed horror at the news of the Korean and Vietnam Wars when he first heard of
thenl. Manhoffs contradiction between fully believing in just war and with revulsion
following post World War II wars epitomizes his lack of reconciliation with his war
experience. He believes that warfare is justified; yet he is plagued by the terror of his
memories and by the possibility of another war. 15
In contrast to Manhoff and Boggs, who sustained both physical and mental
injuries during war, is Frank Dauster, who served in the Anny in both the European and
the Pacific. He viewed the war as a means by which he could escape an unsatisfying job
at Prudential Insurance in New Jersey. He looked forward to serving his country, and
stated, "we had to stop what was going on over there." Dauster's imperative to enter the
Army and fight for his country was based on both patriotic duty and an awareness of the
moral obligation that our country had to the rest of the world. 16

-
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Once in Europe, Dauster began questioning the necessity of warfare. He
describes his first inklings towards pacifism to have resulted from observing the massed
units of weapons and tanks before the Allies crossed the Rhine River. He describes his
image of the amassing of instruments of death as "a vision ofhell.,,17 Dauster's reaction
to the systematic and unremorseful murders in combat indicates that he moralized the war
after he arrived. However, Dauster did not justify his role in the war. Rather, he became
a pacifist who opposes all fonns of violence. Dauster did not sacrifice his physical or
mental health during combat. He rejected World War II and warfare in general as a futile
waste of life. This is not to say that all veterans who are lucky enough to return
unscathed from warfare do not grapple with the savagery of combat. Dauster is a unique
case in point that illuminates the common psychology by which disabled veterans might
justify their sacrifices.
Dauster stated that he did not understand people who think that war is a viable
solution to any problem due to the total disregard for humanity that it includes. He
understands that climates exist in which problems must be resolved; however, the willing
murder of young people by a government is not the means by which Dauster believes
problems can be solved. He protested the Vietnam War, and supported the choices by his
two sons to leave the country during Vietnam. I8
Soldiers returning from combat soon realized the niche that society expected them
to fill. People who had not been to war expected to witness the return of tough, stoic, yet
cheerful soldiers into civilian life. The United States government provided incentives for
quick rehabilitation and incorporation into society in the fonn of the GI Bill. Soldiers
were urged to forget about the war, continue with their education, and begin a family.
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The baby boom that followed W orId War II is a reflection of society's move towards
forgetting the war by looking to the future.
However, the mental and physical reminders that veterans carried made it
impossible for society to eradicate the painful aspects ofWorId War II. The movie The
Best Years of Our Lives illustrates the hardships that men, such as Boggs, Manhoff, and
Dauster, experienced upon their return to civilian life. The main character of the movie
lost both of his hands during the war. To put people at ease in the presence of his
disability, he learned to present himself as genial and unthreatening. However, he
developed other emotions when he returned home that created within him personal
tension. Since no one expected nor wanted him to show signs of bitterness or anger, he
was forced to repress the emotions that kept surfacing.
The veterans of the 1940's returned to a country that emphasized traditional
values of self-help and self-reliance. Upon facing reintegration, all veterans received
advice literature that showed compassion, but urged men, just as they had been urged
while they were in the military, to be tough, uncomplaining, and active in adjusting
themselves to the social order, as it was. They also were told to use their families, wives,
girlfriends, and mothers to provide sympathy. However, the rest of society only wanted
to view the stoic soldier who was once again in control of his life. The main goal of the
national veterans organizations included linking individuals and their families with the
public benefits they were promised under the G.I. Bill of Rights. These rights were
structured so that veterans who had experienced either mental or physical disability could
more easily integrate themselves into society and not depend on anyone.

-
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Neither Boggs nor Dauster were driven by humanitarianism or nl0rality to fight in
World War II. Not even Manhoff, who is Jewish and who stated that he had heard
rumors of what was happening to Jewish citizens in Europe had a driving sense of
humanitarian duty to serve in World War II. However, once these men arrived in Europe
and the Pacific and began taking part in combat, each one eventually came to a
conclusion as to why he was there. Boggs killed a Japanese soldier in close cornbat. He
could do so because he had been trained to kill the enemy, yet his moral foundation
dictated that killing, per se, was wrong. Boggs rationalized that his actions were justified
because "Japanese were doing horrible things, too." Manhoff feels even today an innate
hatred of the German race for the crimes against humanity that they perpetrated and that
which he witnessed in Nancy, France and in Dachau. His initial reason to enter the war
based on duty to his country dwindled once he reached combat. The reality of war
replaced his previously conceived concepts about war, and he rationalized that what the
Gerrnans were doing justified his presence in the European theatre as well as his actions
in combat. Ironically, Manhoffused the basis of humanitarian morality to fuel his
ambition to fight once in combat. Dauster, who was the only veteran mentioned who did
not suffer a medically diagnosed wound, is the only one of the three who is violently
opposed to war as a means to a solution.
Society remembers World War II as a good war because we, the United
States of America, defeated tyranny and fascism around the world. We were the saviors
of democracy. We helped other nations in their fight for the good life, and our nation
profited. However, the individual men who fought daily in combat were not simply
fighting tyranny and fascism. This could have been one of many incentives by people to
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serve the United States in war, but the experience of combat made the war very personal.
The soldier was not fighting tyranny, he was shooting at and being shot at by other
humans. The soldier who experienced combat had a drastically different view of the
good war from that view held by civilians. The good war resulted from the soldier's
ability to perform his duty in combat and synthesize his beliefs with his actions.
Once a soldier who had experienced combat returned to America, his personal
declaration that he fought in a good war helped his reintegration process. However,
society still viewed the war as an absolute good, and caused the soldier to feel isolated
from those whose image of the good war was different from his own. The solace that
veterans, especially wounded veterans, were urged to seek in their families was a naive
solace. Civilian, society urged the wounded veteran to forget about his memory of the
war, and focus solely on that which society had created. In a good war, soldiers go off to

..

combat with enthusiasm. Their experiences in war reinforce their patriotism and belief in

..

do not hinder veterans who fought in a good war, and the manner by which they deal with

-

their duty. The soldiers return as mature men who are to become the pillars of society.
They are the models of manhood to which other n1embers of society defer. Their wounds

their wounds is with bravery and indifference. These mature members of society not
only adapt to civilian life with ease, but they lead civilian society with stoic grace.
Society is grateful for the veterans' contribution in the righteous fight for democracy. A
good war can only result in a good outcome.
In reality, a war is not defined for the soldiers by the political imperative behind

the effort. Rather, the only thing a soldier defines is his own role in the war by
rationalizing his own actions. If he does something that compromises his beliefs, then he
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must create some contrivance of reason by which he can justify having committed the
action. If a soldier can justify the reasons for which he compromised his own moral and
social inculcation, then he participated in a truly good war. If a soldier cannot justify the
reasons for which he compromised his essence, then he is plagued by an overwhelming
sense of wrongdoing. He did not participate in a good war.

-

-

-

-

-

Creation of a Bad War

The image of a bad war, void of morality and laden with unnecessary destruction,
exists in the memories of those who never experienced battle. Weare taught to believe
that violent action among humans is acceptable when it is for a good cause. Thus, the
combat experiences of veterans who participated in a war that society has deemed a bad
cause are unacceptable to the civilians who did not participate. The veterans of the
stigmatized "bad" war become "bad" veterans, "bad" citizens, and "bad" humans. If a
war will not conform to the popularized notion of a good war, society seeks distance.
The resulting atrocities that accompany all wars are not viewed as necessary sacrifice;
rather, they are viewed as a reflection upon a distinctly separate part of society: the men
who fought in the war.
In World War II as in the Vietnam War, exuberant boys who returned home as
reserved men caused society to realize that the events of war are life changing and
permanent. However, men returning to small communities following the Vietnam War
returned not to an idealistic in1age of the war and why it was fought, but instead to the
confusion that Vietnam caused in both its civilians as well as its veterans. Instead of the

-
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equally isolating heroes' welcome of World War II, Vietnam veterans returned to silence
at best and condemnation at worst.
A bad war is constructed in our collective memory when we see a shameful
situation in which soldiers, not boys, go to fight in a war that is as confusing as it is
distant. The events that occur during combat are not simply accepted as part of war, and
they are argued about and questioned by civilians for fear of being included in the defeat.
Soldiers, not men, return home to an ideologically pure nation, and are pushed to the
fringe of a self-proclaimed innocent society. What the soldiers experienced in combat is
of extreme interest to the rest of society because it confirms the difference between a
soldier and a civilian. The blame of a bad war is volleyed from one arena to the next, and
the men who fought in the war are considered the final resting place of that blame.
Instead of accepting the veterans' perspective of war, society forces these bearers of
reality to conform to the popular image of a shameful war.

Glorious wars produce

heroic veterans. Inglorious wars produce antiheroes, even villains and deviants.
While many young Americans today recall Vietnam through media coverage of
the anti-war movement as a war that divided our nation, the boys who enlisted to serve in
the military during Vietnam remember patriotism as a footpath to confusion. Instead of
assigning mature men from the American spectrum with a clear sense of purpose to fight
the war, the United States sent teenagers from a limited sliver of America to fight. It was
a war that they were as much confused by as they were motivated to serve their country.
American boys volunteered and were conscripted to serve their country at an average age
of nineteen, on average seven years younger than their forbearers who served in World
War II.19 As with their fathers' generation, the American Vietnam generation readied for
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a war in a foreign place. Their ensuing confusion at what then happened was
understandable.
American servicemen did not volunteer nor were they conscripted to serve their
country to fight a fascist Hitler or a nation that brazenly and suddenly attacked America.
Instead, Americans who served their nation during Vietnam were responding to a siren
that had been sounded during the entirety of their youths: Communism. Yet, the
manifestation of this threat was Ho Chi Minh, an aged socialist who had been our ally
during World War II but whose culture was as unfamiliar to Americans as his country.
Inheriting a situation from the defeated French, the United States in the early 1960's was
guided by the Cold War impulse to save the world from the threat of international
communisnl. To ask a GI why he was fighting was an absurd question to most. He
answered in the same way that soldiers have nearly always answered: We're here because
we're here. Some answered by saying that they were in Vietnam "to stop communism,"
but this is difficult to interpret because "communism" was an all-purpose term whose
meaning often meant "whoever we are supposed to be fighting against." 20 Among those
who supported the war was the sense that it was a man's duty to fight for his country,
right or wrong. This implied a belief in the legitimacy of American presidential
administrations and American political institutions in general. If experience in Vietnam
led GI's to doubt this reasoning, it consecutively happened that such men lost faith in the
political system that sent them over there.
The Vietnam War spanned the time of four American Presidential offices,
beginning with Eisenhower and ending on a technicality with Nixon. Believing in its
own invincibility through technology, America fought in Vietnam. However, since the
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political and military goals of the war were rarely apparent or articulated, the
technological strength behind the American military was often counterproductive.
Hamlets were destroyed only to increase the number of North Vietnamese Army recruits.
Containment policies and confusing restrictions often resulted in GI's taking and retaking
the same hill several times a year. While a great majority of men volunteered or served
in Vietnam because they felt it was their patriotic duty, the policy that they encountered
in corrlbat were contradictions to their initial imperatives to fight. As a machine gun
squad leader in the Twenty-sixth Marines in 1967, Danny Cruz commented on the
contradiction between the loyalty a serviceman felt to his nation and the confusion of the
mission in Vietnam: "Despite my intense loyalty to my country, my strong feelings in
favor of support of my country, I can't help but think sometimes that the war was all a
big trick." With such meaningless risk and loss of life, it was inevitable that the n1en who
experienced combat in Vietnam also experienced major confusion about their value to the
American government even before they returned home.
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Men who fought in Vietnam were not the only Americans to experience the
confusion of the Vietnam War. While the civilian perspective of the war was markedly
different from that of the veteran, it was similar in its mutual disappointment in the war.
Veterans had expected their patriotism and faith in the nation's leadership to be
confirmed through their experience in cOlTlbat, as had their fathers' been confirmed in
World War II. Civilians who did not initially oppose the war expected the same thing.
American civilians who opposed the war also felt that the World War II
generation was able to justify their combat experience while An1erican servicemen in
Vietnam were denied that ability. Lawrence Wright, an American author who faced the
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prospect of fighting in a war in which he did not believe, stated "I would defend my
country if it were attacked. I would have fought in World War ll. I was not a pacifist.,,22
At first, the Vietnam War appeared in American living rooms as snappy inserts
into nightly television news programs, provoking little more interest than any local
headline. Americans began to expect to see the images and were no longer shocked by
the blips in the news about the fighting in Vietnam. On the news production end of the
spectrum, each day a new shipment of aluminum cans of 16-millimeter film would be
shipped to network offices across the nation, where the images would be clipped and cut
to two-minute images of the war in Vietnam. Because of the increase in the publics'
reliance on television for its news, the infomlation that the public received was limited to
something that was visually exciting but was accompanied only by cursory scripts that
hardly touched on the real issues of Vietnam. The images of huts made of mud and
straw, weary young men bearing arms in the jungle, and hollow-eyed civilians were
something to look at, and all of it was easily erased with the tum of a channel. Writers
and producers saw so much of it that they succunlbed to processing the footage, rather
than trying to understand it. Civilians saw so much of it that they derived a false sense of
security from the repetitiveness of the images. 23
Civilians were not ignorant of America's increasing pledge of young lives in
Vietnam, nor were they intentionally flippant about the gravity of warfare. An entire
generation of Americans knew of the hardships and horrors of war. However, this
generation also knew only victory and its ensuing national ride to world power. It was
virtually impossible for the forbearers of the Vietnam generation to imagine war without
dominance, without prominent objectives, and without victory. Thus, the images that
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Americans watched each night as they ate dinner were somehow familiar. What was
unfathomable to the Americans who were not in Vietnam was why the images continued
to appear. Why was the war lasting so long, why was America still fighting?
Considering the optimism of the American government, the victorious concept of war in
an entire generation of Americans' minds, and the technological superiority of America
over Vietnam, American civilians could not help but be confused by the war as the
government prolonged and progressed the nation's involvement.
As the war became longer and American civilians became more confused once
soldiers retuTIled home bringing incomprehensible stories of combat, an anti-war
movement began to emerge. Initially only in large cities, on the coasts and in college
campuses, the anti-war movement garnered national attention. This movement divided
not only a generation from a generation, but also a generation within itself.
The Vietnam generation came of age in a world that had been created by the
World War II generation. The World War II generation grew up in an age that was
drastically different from the years of the Vietnam generations' collective youth. They
spent a good portion of their childhood during the Depression, and the civilian world as
well as the American military benefited greatly from the War. The Japanese bombed
Pearl Harbor, giving Americans no choice in World War II. In Europe, a madman was
overrunning civilization, conquering entire nations in a matter of days. The enemies
were formidable and clearly evil. America had heroes, of the magnitude of Patton and
Nimitz as well as the hometown heroes who returned home with medals and promotions.
If the hometown heroes did not return home, they at least died for a cause that everyone
endorsed. Following America's victory, the World War II generation returned home to
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build their lives very differently from the manner in which they had spent their
childhood. While the return of the World War IT veteran to America was no less difficult
for him personally than the return of the Vietnam veteran, the two generations of soldiers
undoubtedly returned to a different country.
The Vietnam generation grew up in another world, the suburban comfort zone, a
new world invented by people like their fathers to give form to their need for order,
security, prosperity, and peace. 24 It was America's promised land, a grid work of tract
homes, two car garages, schools and cultivated lawns. The families of the World War II
generation were upwardly mobile, a buzzword that could not apply to the youth of the
World War II generation. Their strength came from survival. The darker reflection of
World War II shadowed the Vietnam generation in a sense that they grew up with fall-out
shelters, civil defense sirens, brinkmanship, and Godless Communists. The very life that
their fathers and mothers cultivated for them caused the inherent differences between the
two generations.
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Because of the sheer length of the war in Vietnam, the differences within a single
generation emerged as an illustration of the publics' changing mindset. The older
members of the baby boom generation were the first to go to war. They were also the
only part of the generation to reflect the mindset of their parents' World War II
experiences. With the average age of American servicemen in Vietnam as nineteen,
those who went to Vietnam before 1968 were the first-borns, the earliest wave of the
baby boomers. They had perceived Communism as an imminent threat during their
youth, and had heard their parents' glorified stories of the war years. This made
America's call to service in Vietnam an obvious duty for thenl to fulfill. The patriotism
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and full belief that Vietnanl was to be a war against the spread ofintemational
communism of the early Vietnam generation was a bond that they shared with their
parents and the rest of the World War II generation.
Following 1968, the mood of the Vietnam generation as well as the general mood
of the civilian population in America changed drastically. While the younger wave of
baby boomers had heard their parents' glorious wartime stories, they also heard stories
from their big brothers, uncles, and neighbors about Vietnam. The stories that the
younger part of the Vietnam generation heard had not yet had time to become glorious.
They revealed more of the realities of warfare than did the stories from World War II that
the older Vietnam generation had heard. Additionally, they watched visual images of the
war in Vietnam on television for half a decade by the time they were able to serve. No
longer did illusions exist that Vietnam was going to be a short flexing of America's
military might. Civilians who did not actively protest the war began questioning in
private the heavy involvement of the military in a defensive position only, and the

-

-

-

strategy of the war seemed inexplicable to those who had ever served. With the
uncertainty that surrounded the post-1968 segment of the Vietnam generation, qualifying
for a deferment or drawing a low draft number decreased the pressure they felt to serve in
Vietnam. The changing mood of the nation and the method of conscription during the
war gave otherwise willing volunteers a way out of the confusion ofVietnam. 26
In addition to the confusion that the American veteran felt during his service in

Vietnam due to the contradictions between his sense of duty to America and the
government's wartime restrictions, the strain of guerilla warfare weighed heavily on the
veteran. Marshal Tran Hung Dao, the Vietnamese general who defeated the Mongol
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invaders from the north in the thirteenth century, described his strategy in terms that
scarcely differed from those of Vietnam:
The enemy must fight his battles far from home for a long time .... We must
weaken him by drawing him into protracted campaigns. Once his initial dash is broken,
it will be easier to destroy him .... When the enemy is away from home for a long time and
produces no victories and families learn of their dead, then the enemy population
considers it a Mandate from Heaven that the armies be recalled. Time is always in our
favor. Our climate, mountains and jungles discourage the enemy; but for us they offer
both sanctuary and a place from which to attack. 27
By 1965 in Vietnam, there were two kinds of wars, guerrilla war and limited war.
An array of American civil and military presence in Vietnam paired with an executive

staff in Washington who had little idea of the enemy they were fighting or the society
from which he came resulted in America's inability to fight the enemy, then finally, how
to stop him for good. What the United States learned in ten years up to 1965 was how to
weaken the guerrillas militarily without being able to defeat them. 28
One of the problems that advanced industrial societies have in warring on
underdeveloped, pre-industrial societies is that there is very little value in destroying a
target in the pre-industrial society. A pre-industrial society does not rely upon social
structures, and the loss of them does little damage to the enemy's strength. The
American kind of war machine operates best against social and economic structures
almost as complex and well integrated as its own. This was not the case in Vietnam.
A problem that the American serviceman faced in fighting a guerilla war in
Vietnam was how to identify the enemy. The servicemen had certain territorial
sanctuaries that, because of the political limitations of the war, U.S. commanders were
forbidden to strike. By 1971, American forces had penetrated all of the enemy's
territorial sanctuaries without significantly inhibiting his long-term ability to continue
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fighting. The basic military problem in Vietnam for Anlerican ground forces was stated
by Colonel Robert Rigg, in his handbook for troops, How to Survive in Vietnam. "The
enemy knows more about your unit and installations than you know about his.,,29
American troops fought an enemy who operated by hit-and-run, ambush-and-hide, and
nighttime operations. In the field, the way this lack of intelligence affected tactics was
simple: if we never knew where or when the enemy would strike, he had to be lured into
attacking us when we were ready for him. The search and destroy operation served as the
principle tactic to do this. For American servicemen in Vietnam, to bait and then catch
the enemy reduced the infantry role to the point of expendability.
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An additional complication to the American role in Vietnam was that American
soldiers were fighting to protect some Vietnamese against others. To add to this
complexity was the fact that many civic action projects were aimed at villages that
harbored communist sympathizers. Essentially, American GI's would direct civic action
towards a village one day in order "to win the hearts and minds of the people," and the
next day engage the enemy in virtually the same place. With the an1biguity of their
purpose in Vietnam already questioned, American servicemen faced the problem of not
knowing who the enemy was with growing disillusionment towards the American
government.
Another strain on the GI was the method by which troops arrived and departed
from Vietnam. It would be hard to overstate the soldiers' constant concern with how
much time he had left to serve. The paramount factor affecting combat motivation in
Vietnam was the rotation system. The rotation system affected social cohesion and
individual motivation. The rapid turnover of personnel hindered the development of
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close personal attachments among soldiers and it consequentially rotated out of the unit
men with the most combat experience and knowledge. The combination of these two
factors was that common knowledge was not shared between the young and old GI's.
Overall, the rotation system reinforced an individualistic perspective that was essentially
self-concerned. The end of the war was not marked by its eventual outcome, whether
victory or defeat. Instead, the end of the war was marked by the individual's rotation
date.
The rotation system significantly affected the appearance of the war from a
civilian perspective. During the period of the war when it was on an upswing, the
rotation system contributed to the nlorale of the individual cOlllbat soldier. However,
once the war was on a downswing, the rotation system worked against combat
effectiveness. Once Americans at home as well as in Vietnam began to realize that the
war could only come to an inconclusive end, the feeling of not wanting to be the last man
killed in a closing war characterized the low morale of civilians and servicemen after
1968. 31
Vietnam veterans today have as varied sentiments about the war in which they
fought as they do opinions. Instead of returning home to a society that wanted to quietly
omit the memory of battle from its consciousness, as veterans did in World War II,
Vietnam veterans returned to a society that had changed deeply in its social structure and
that reveled in the combat memories of Vietnam. A situation such as this, where
everyone in society had their own opinion about the war, made it difficult for actual
veterans to talk about their experiences in combat. Veterans faced a barrage of combat
frenzy once they returned to America, from movies that portrayed veterans as victims or
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sociopaths to civilians whose image of America had been shaken by the deep social
changes of the time and who placed the blame for this upon the men who fought in
Vietnam. The following excerpts from interviews with Vietnam veterans serve as a
microcosm of veteran sentiments about the war and its effects upon them as well as the
nation as a whole.
Ted A. Burton served as an Army medic in Vietnam from 1967 to 1968. He is
from Hawkins County, Tennessee. Much like the background of many World War II
veterans, Burton dropped out of high school to work in order to help his parents and six
siblings. By 1966, Burton realized "that Vietnam was a real war" and he was about to be
drafted. Even though he was married, his draft rating was so high that no one wanted to
hire him. With his name up for the September draft call in Hawkins County, Burton
volunteered for the draft in August.
Burton chose to be a medic during basic training because of his religious
background as a Primitive Baptist minister prior to being drafted. According to Burton,
"I figured I could help people more that way than shooting at somebody. I didn't want to
kill people; I didn't think I could do it. ... But after I got in, got over to Vietnam and seen
my best friends die, a lot of them in my arms, if I could have, I guess I would have killed
all them VC." Burton became very attached to the men in his platoon. According to him,
it was hard not to be attached because they all depended on one another. "Grunts look up
to a medic. It was a two-way street, I appreciated them, too."
Burton's company was "out in the field most all the time." He spent 363 days in
Vietnam and recalled spending no longer than three weeks in the rear. His interaction
with the enemy was symbolic of the ambiguous nature of the American role in Vietnam.
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He stated that he usually went on an ambush every third night. "Most of the time Charlie
would get us before we'd get him. He would set up a homemade Claymore and blow it
on us before we ever knew he was around, even during a cease-fire. Of course, we didn't
pay much attention to cease-fires, either. Ifwe saw a VC, we shot him." While Burton
recalled the inability of American soldiers to refrain from firing at an alleged VC as a
result of the danger that it would place on themselves not to, he also experienced
medcaps, which were civic action missions that stemmed from the mission to win the
hearts and minds of the people. Even on these goodwill missions, Burton felt
endangered. "Not long before I left over there, they sent us out to a village near Di
An ... didn't sent no infantry or nothing with us. As soon as we rolled into the place,

Vietnamese came running from everywhere to show us their little scratches." He
remarked feeling as though one of the men who received medical attention could have
been a VC because of the nature of the wound. However, his role for that afternoon was
to supply medical treatment to the villagers, even though he felt it was at times
contradictory to the American combat mission in Vietnanl.
While returning to America, Burton was spit on in the Newark Airport by "a
young hippie-looking thing, a college-age girl" that had seen them as they walked into
the terminal in their khakis. Burton had heard about "what was going on in the States"
from replacements to his company. According to Burton, "if I could have got by with it,
I'd have done a few things. If I could get by with it, I'd still do some things. These draftdodgers, Jane Fonda, line 'em up against a wall. I had a lot better people than they are
die over there, and I ain't forgot them. Way I feel, they're just walking on their graves,
what they done." Burton had not returned to America undaunted by his combat
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expenences. He was hospitalized for several days for "nerves" after he watched a young
soldier die in an ambush. However unjustified he believed the deaths of friends in
combat was, Burton felt that the behavior of some American civilians towards Vietnam
veterans at home was even more unjustified.
Today, Burton returns to the war every day. According to him, "the way the war
ended, that was just all those boys' lives down the drain. It would have been worth it if
they had let us fight, let us win. I believe that was a politicians' war." He also stated,
"but you know, I'm awfully proud of what I did in Vietnam. If I had it to do over, I'd go
again." Burton's conflicting remarks, and the fact that he moralized his role in the war as
completely separate from the government's role in the war, illustrates the confusion that
Vietnam brought to an entire society.32
Richard C. Ensminger served as a Marine forward observer during two tours of
duty in Vietnam in 1966-1967 and in 1969. He grew up in a military family and had a
stepfather who worked in naval intelligence. He quit high school in 1963 after he moved
from a big high school in Nashville to a school of only about 900 kids. To Ensminger,
the move was not a good one, there was nothing to be involved in, and he was tired of
moving, so he joined the Marines. After serving with the Second Marines at Camp
Lejeune for nearly two years, he received orders to Vietnam in 1965. According to
Ensminger, many of his friends were going to Vietnam at about the same time, but none
of them knew what type of situation Vietnam was. "Most of us only knew war from
movies and books and talking with higher-ranking sergeants (who had not served in
Vietnam}."
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Upon arrival in Vietnam, Ensminger recalled, "the old-timers who had been in
Vietnam wouldn't have anything to do with me. I had to prove to them that I wouldn't
get them killed during their last months, even days, in Vietnam." Also, he stated, "most
marine grunts were good for only six to eight months of combat. For the last couple of
months before a guy's DEROS, we just left him alone because he had the short-timer's
attitude. They didn't want to go out in the field; they were afraid some guy would screw
up their chances of going home."
When Ensminger returned home after his first tour of duty, he felt isolated from
the rest of America enough to request a second tour. "When I went to Vietnam, I
believed it was my duty to go over there and fight for my country. I knew I had done
something worthwhile, but I wasn't prepared for the demonstrations against the war here,
for the people who downgraded me for being in the military. As I saw it, there were three
groups of people in the United States: the older people who didn't care about the war, the
kids who didn't understand it, and those who were totally against Vietnam." A little
more than a year after he returned to the United States, Ensminger volunteered to go back
to Vietnam because he "didn't feel comfortable going outside a military base. I felt I
wasn't wanted in American society, and I was getting tired of the petty, spit-shined
mentality of the stateside marines."
Ensminger immediately noticed changes in Vietnam as well as the Marines when
he returned to Vietnam. His second tour in 1969 was with draftees as opposed to all
volunteers. He also noticed the drug use of servicemen and commented that it caused
him to not completely trust everyone in his company. He also stated that "now the war
seemed like one endless search-and-destroy mission." In June of 1969, Ensminger was
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severely wounded and had his left leg amputated. He returned home, where his reliance
on prescription pain medicine turned into a dependency that he eventually had to
confront. He felt isolated from his parents and had a difficult time making friends .
According to Ensminger, "probably the only people I can really relate to are the members
of the Disabled American Veterans chapter in Boone." In retrospect, Ensnlinger believes
that "the war started out as a just cause that ended up being a very political affair. A lot
of people made a lot of money off it; some still are. In one way, I'm proud that I served
my country. But I'm not proud of what I did over there." Unlike Burton, Ensminger
justified the actions of his country during Vietnam as well as his call to duty; however, he
has yet to justify his own actions .
The wound suffered by Ensminger illuminates yet another aspect of the Vietnam
War that made it difficult for the veteran to return home. In a study of alienation and
estrangement among wounded Vietnam veterans, Loch Johnson examines the attitudes of
wounded veterans toward the government that sent them into an unpopular war. In
Vietnam, the veteran was not given a hero's welcome or widespread respect. The
severely wounded veteran received fewer benefits than their counterparts who served in
World War II and the Korean War.
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Additionally, the nature of the wound affected the

veterans' alienation. Heroic wounds fronl a fierce battle might be nlore easily justified,
and might encourage ajustification of the war itself by the wounded veteran. However,
the majority of wounds inflicted in Vietnam came from "booby trap" devices which were
seen as accidental. Finally, Johnson's study found that men who were drafted, who were
not committed to the rationale behind the war, and who were not officers were eventually
the most likely to be estranged from the rest of society.34
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Ed Shore served as an officer in the infantry of the Marine Corps from 1968 to
1969. He grew up in Depression era poverty as one of ten children in his family in
Maryville, Tennessee. At the age of thirteen, Shore left home to earn a living. While
living alone and managing the farm of a local family, Shore attended high school and
became resolute in his plans to attend college. He felt that an education "was the ticket
out of that impoverished situation."
As a child, Shore had been enthusiastic about the military, and based much of his
knowledge on the heroic stories depicted in the movies and by an uncle who served in
World War II. He recalls feeling drawn to the toughness, bravery, and excitement of
combat. As an agriculture student at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, nearly all of
Shore's professors were World War II or Korean War veterans. His collegiate experience
from 1961 to 1966 was not impacted by the anti-war movement that was spreading across
many college campuses at that time. In fact, Shore recalls using his future military career
as a way to finesse certain professors to increase his grade. He told them that he would
be unable to become an officer in the Marine Corps with poor grades, and noted the
occasional assistance of professors. This is an ironic contrast to the story of many
college students at the time who persuaded professors to help their grade in order to avoid
fighting in the war.
Shore graduated from the University of Tennessee in 1966 and enlisted in the
Marine Corps in March of 1967. In the interim, he shoed horses on a military base for
work. In fact, because his employers did not want him to be drafted, he was placed in the
coveted Air National Guard during his last year in college and during the year following
graduation. However, instead of remaining in the relative safe haven of the Air National
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Guard, Shore joined the Marine Corps. He felt that he had a duty to his country, and
against the advice of many family members and friends, he prepared to attend Officer
Candidate School for the Marines.
Shore was commissioned as an officer in the Marine Corps and was immediately
sent to Vietnan1 as a 2nd Liutenant in charge of an infantry division during the Tet
Offensive. He saw heavy combat action during his thirteen months in Vietnam, and
during his thirteen months in Vietnam received the Silver Star, a Navy Commendation,
two Purple Hearts, and the Cross of Gallantry.
In June, Shore led a battalion of Marines into combat on Go Noi Island as part of
Operation Allenbrook. For two weeks, he and his n1en fought day and night. Wounded
on June 15, Shore was taken to a hospital in Vietnam where the officer of the NYA with
an equivalent rank to Shore was also wounded. He recalled being in beds facing each
other, both having barely survived the same battle. According to Shore, he felt little
desire to seek revenge on his enemy, now roommate, because "he was doing the same
thing I was by fighting. If I condemned him for what he was doing, then I would be
condemning myself."
Following his release from the hospital, Shore was given the job of Agricultural
Advisor to the Vietnamese. In retrospect, Shore believes that the measure of success that
was used during Vietnam, the body count, was not only inaccurate but also the wrong
measuring device. Instead, he believes that the measure of success in Vietnam should
have focused more on the success that the military had in helping the people through the
hearts and minds campaign. However, Shore feels that "the greatest experience, the most
challenging, the most rewarding experience of my life was defined during combat.
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Combat was the most important part of my life. I am proud, confident, but humbled by
war." He feels that his role in the destructive part of the war in combat prepared him for
his role in the constructive part of the war. By maintaining his moral code during
combat, Shore is proud of his actions in combat. By surviving the constant threat of
enemy attack, Shore is confident in his ability to rely on himself and overcome
challenges. By bearing witness to the destruction of war through his combat experiences,
Shore is humbled by the bravery, loss, and sacrifice of all people during war.
Upon returning home, Shore experienced no hostility from civilians for his part in
the War. His only experience with civilians who opposed the war was during a job
interview in which the interviewer was "obviously not favorable to the military."
However, this was not a common experience for Shore and he had no trouble finding a
job. He did not remain in the Marine Corps, stating "I would have made a terrible
stateside Marine officer." After being discharged, Shore served in the National Guard for
fifteen years. The only veterans' association to which Shore has belonged is the Marine
Corps Association. When asked if he felt that the government could have made his return
home any easier, Shore replied "the government doesn't owe me anything. I served
because it was what I owed the nation. I didn't need any hand-out." Shore has remained
in contact with several men with whom he served. In 1976 he formed his own
construction and development business and today continues to work.
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Following any mass scale military operation, the government must devise a plan
to return servicemen to the civilian society. This plan must be thorough enough to
include any assistance that the veteran needs along the way, including health care,
education, transportation, and social integration. The GI Bill has served as the umbrella
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under which most of these interests fall. However, it is a malleable service that reflects
the attitude of the government towards the military and its role in general during the era
in which it is used. School enrollment for the period 1966-1971 included 31.2 percent of
the eligible population of veterans. However, this level of participation is significantly
lower than the 39.8 percent participation rate in the first five years of the World War II
program. Equally poor in comparison is the rate of participation in post-service training.
From 1966 to 1970 only 26 percent became trainees under the GI Bill, whereas between
1944 and1948, 35 percent of World War II veterans entered training programs. The
situation of the Vietnam veteran was exactly the same as confronted them before the
service: they wanted to go to college but they could not afford it, even on the GI Bill.
Additionally, the differences in medical procedures between World War II and the
Vietnam War resulted in fewer fatalities to injuries that would have been fatal during
World War II. As a result, Vietnam produced totally disabled servicemen at three times
the rate of World War 11. 36 This, compounded with the government's policy of denial of
Agent Orange damages or malaria cases resulted in a nluch-decreased health care policy
for veterans.
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Society remembers Vietnam as a bad war because the government of the United
States of America flexed its military might against a pre-industrial society while
prolonging the loss of both American and Vietnamese lives. We were not the saviors of
democracy. We involved ourselves in a culture that we did not fully understand,
committed our servicemen to a war that they were not fully allowed to fight, and our
society reflected the confusion of the process. However, the individual men who fought
daily in combat were there, regardless of their many different reasons, in an individual
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attempt to fulfill their individual duty to America. The men who served could have been
influenced by any number of the changes in society at the time; however, the experience
of combat made the war very personal. A personal war is not a war that is easily written
off in the minds of the men who experienced it. The soldier might not have been fighting

-

tyranny, but he was shooting and being shot at by other humans. The soldier who

...

experienced combat had a drastically different view of the bad war from that view held

-

by civilians.

...

...

-

-

-

-

In World War II as in the Vietnam War, American society placed labels on war
that reflected their own civilian involvement. World War II was a good war to civilians
because it brought victory, honor, and economic benefits to their lives. It returned to
them their sons, husbands, and fathers in a manner fitting of the good fight. They began
their collective quest for security and order in a world in which all was well. Conversely,
the Vietnam War was a bad war to civilians because it brought an undefined ending, little
honor to the civilian society, and virtually no economic benefit to their lives. It returned
to them their sons, husbands, and fathers in a manner unfitting of the good fight, and it
vilified an entire generation of men. Because of the length of the war, nothing seemed to
completely be as it was before the war, and security and order were scarce. The good
war and the bad war reflected the experiences of the civilians who did not endure combat.
In the reality of the men who experienced combat, and who are the most qualified

to label a particular war, neither good wars nor bad wars exist. While veterans of World
War II and veterans of Vietnam were treated drastically different by the societies to
which they returned, their shared feelings of isolation and unrest evolved from returning
to societies whose constructs of the wars in which they fought reflected the civilians'

-

-
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shared involvement in the war, not the involvement of the veterans. The combat
experiences of veterans in the good war and in the bad war are strikingly similar, and in
their eyes, there is but one type of war that exists. War is neither good nor bad, but
amoral. The men who experienced war know this. Society does not.

-

-

-
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III Unemployment Rates for Veterans of Wars During periods of
Reduction in Armed Forces Strength

Period
December 1945
January 1946
November 1953
October-December 1969
One year later:
December 1946
January 1947
November 1954
October-December 1970
Two years later:
December 1947
January 1948
November 1955
SOURCE:

WORLD
WAR II

KOREAN
CONFLICT

VIETNAM
ERA

Veterans aged
20-44 years

Veterans aged
16-44 years

Veterans aged
20-29 years

14.9
13.0
7.0
4.7
6.7
6.9
7.9

7.9
""'\

4.0
4.5
4.2

Data on Vietnam Era Veterans, Veterans Administration, June 1971, 16.

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

V Distribution of Diagnoses of Psychiatric Patients Under 26 Years of
Age, For Three Wars, Minneapolis VA Hospital
PERCENT
Diagnosis
Schizophrenia
Affective disorders
Personality disorders
Psychoneurotic disorders
Other diagnoses

World War II
(N = 76)
39.5

o

6.6
43.4
10.5

Korean Era
(N

=

29.1
0.9
18.7
40.2
11.1

234)

Vietnam Era
(N = 458)
33.4

0.7
36.2
24.0

5.7

SOURCE: Gayle K. Lumry and Gordon A. Braatz, The Vietnam Era Veteran and psychiatric
Implications, unpub. paper, Minneapolis, Minn.: Veterans Administration Hospital, Psychology
Service, 1970. Used by permission of the authors.
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Method of Raising Army Troops for World War II, the Korean War,
and the Vietnam War
PERCENT OF TOTAL
PROCUREMENT

World War II
(1941-46)

Korea

Vietnam

62
13

48
33

11

16
1
98*

Method 0/ procurement

Induction (Draft)
Enlistment (first term)
Reenlistment
Reserves to active duty
Total

75

20
5

100

12
98*

• Does not sum to 100 percent owing to rounding of numbers.
SOURCE: Computed from data supplied by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Comptroller, Directorate of Information Operations, February 12, 1971.
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II Educational Attainment at Time of Separation from the Armed
Forces of Vietnam Theater Veterans and Vietnam Era Veterans, Fi~cal
Years 1965-1 971
PERCENT

Fiscal
year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

Total
SOURCE:

Less than
12 years
of school
VNT VNE
12.5
22.9
23.6
19.6
18.3
17.5
14.7
17.9

28.4
22.3
23.3
20.3
18.2
20.0
19.2
20.8

12 years of
school
VNT VNE
8l.5
62.5
61.8
65.5
60.0
56.9
55.4
59.2

55.2
59.5
59.5
61.7
60.4
56.6
54.9
58.2

4 or more
years of
college
VNT VNE

1-3 years of
college
VNT VNE
8.3
9.0
8.7
15.9
17.0
19.4
15.2

10.2
10.9
10.4
12.3
14.7
15.1
16.0
13.5

6.3
5.6
6.2
5.8
8.6
10.5
7.7

6.4
7.3
6.4
5.7
6.7
8.3
9.9
7.5

Reports and Statistics Service, Office of Controller, Veterans Administration, April 11,

1972.
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